Chile, the Biobio, and the Future of the Columbia River Basin by Long, Jerrold A.
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Faculty Scholarship
2017
Chile, the Biobio, and the Future of the Columbia
River Basin
Jerrold A. Long
University of Idaho College of Law, jlong@uidaho.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the
Water Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
53 Idaho L. Rev. 239 (2017)
 CHILE, THE BIOBÍO, AND THE FUTURE OF THE COLUMBIA 
RIVER BASIN 
 
JERROLD A. LONG, SHANA HIRSCH, JASON WALTERS 
 
Jerrold A. Long et al., Chile, the Biobío, and the Future of the Columbia River 
Basin, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 239 (2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article © Copyright 2017 Idaho Law Review Except as otherwise 
expressly provided, permission is hereby granted to photocopy materials from 
this publication for classroom use, provided that: (1) Copies are distributed at 
or below cost; (2) The author of the article and the Idaho Law Review are 
properly identified; (3) Proper notice of the copyright is affixed to each copy; 
and (4) Notice of the use is given to the Idaho Law Review. 
 
CHILE, THE BIOBÍO, AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 
JERROLD A. LONG,* SHANA HIRSCH,** JASON WALTERS*** 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 240 
II. FINDING LESSONS IN THE DIFFERENCES: WHY 
COMPARING CHILE AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER 
BASIN MAKES SENSE .................................................. 242 
A. Climate Change and Altered Hydrologic Regimes ..... 242 
B. United States Analogues to the Biobío ....................... 244 
III. WATER RESOURCE HISTORIES .................................. 247 
A. “Redemption” of the arid lands—Water resource 
development in the Columbia River Basin ................ 247 
B. Dams and the Engines of Economic Development 
in Chile ........................................................................ 250 
IV. LEGAL REGIMES REGULATING WATER 
RESOURCES ................................................................... 255 
A. Prior Appropriation and Dam Building ...................... 256 
B. Chilean Water Law and the Private Market.............. 260 
V. ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES AND CONNECTIONS 
TO THE NATURAL WORLD .......................................... 274 
                                                          
 * Jerrold A. (Jerry) Long is a Professor of Law and an Affiliate Professor in the 
Bioregional Planning, Community Design and Water Resources programs at the University of 
Idaho. He earned a J.D. from the University of Colorado-Boulder in 2000 and a Ph.D. in Envi-
ronment and Resources from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2008. 
 ** Shana Hirsch is an IGERT Fellow, Northwest Climate Science Center Fellow, 
and PhD Candidate in the Water Resources Program at the University of Idaho. 
 *** Jason Walters is an IGERT Fellow and PhD Candidate in the Water Resources 
Program at the University of Idaho. 
240 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................. 283 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two years, three different groups of students and 
faculty from the University of Idaho’s Water Resources program 
have visited Concepción, Chile to study water resource issues in 
the Biobío River Basin. As part of a National Science Foundation 
funded Integrated Graduate Education and Research Traineeship 
(IGERT) program,1 these visits sought to expose the Idaho students 
to water resource issues in a different legal, cultural, and physical 
environment. Hosted by the European Union-Latin American 
(EULA) Center for the Environment/Faculty of Environmental Sci-
ences located at the University of Concepción and the Civil Engi-
neering Department at the Catholic University of the Most Holy 
Conception, the program also gave the students the opportunity to 
collaborate with Chilean researchers and students. While the stu-
dents (and their faculty advisors) succeeded in learning a signifi-
cant amount of information in a short period of time—with invalu-
able help from Chilean students and faculty colleagues—the most 
significant lessons learned in Chile were not about the Biobío or 
Chilean law or culture. Rather, the most significant, and hopefully 
longest-lasting, lessons were about the water resource issues we 
face at home in Idaho. 
One of our challenges was to avoid viewing Chile only through 
the lens of our own experiences. When comparing our legal insti-
tutions—in this case, water resource institutions—to those of de-
veloping nations, it is simplest to assume that our successes are 
the result of wise choices, careful and strategic institutional de-
sign, a free-market economy, or legal stability. Our first response 
to a problem is often, “well, this is what we do…,” with the implicit 
assumption that our approach should work in the new context as 
well. And to some extent, it was an appreciation of a U.S.-style 
market economy that led Chile’s “Chicago Boys” to develop a water 
code that relies almost entirely on privatization and freely tradable 
                                                          
 1. See Integrative Graduate Education & Research Traineeship, U. OF IDAHO 
http://www.uidaho.edu/cals/departments/water-resources/igert (last visited Oct. 19, 2016); 
IGERT: Adaptation to Change in Water Resources: Science to Inform Decision-making Across 
Disciplines, Cultures and Scales, NAT’L SCI. F. http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/show-
Award?AWD_ID=1249400 (last visited Oct. 19, 2016). 
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water rights, with little to no government regulation over how, 
where, when, why, or even if water is used.2 
But what appear to be benefits of our system, relative to 
Chile—i.e., situations in which we seem to avoid conflict—might 
rather be byproducts of our own mistakes, or the luck of historical, 
geographical, or ecological context. Thus, we should be cautious 
when we assess water resource conflicts in new geographical, eco-
logical, hydrological, legal, and cultural settings. It may be, and 
perhaps is likely, that what has worked for us will not work in a 
different context. Perhaps less obvious, but more important, is that 
climate change will ultimately render a new Columbia River Basin 
that is different ecologically, hydrologically, culturally, and per-
haps legally from what we know today—our own home will transi-
tion to that different context for which our current institutions 
might not work.3 
This article will use the Chilean water resources experience—
with a particular focus on dams and water infrastructure develop-
ment in the Biobío River Basin—as a context for considering how 
climate change might affect water resources and water resource 
management in the Columbia River Basin. Because Chile might 
provide a useful example for how climate change might affect the 
Columbia River Basin, the first section will discuss the similarities 
and differences between the two places and how climate change 
likely will affect them both. The second section will provide brief 
development histories, focusing on dam and other infrastructure 
                                                          
 2. There have been gradual, incremental changes in Chile’s Water Code since it was 
first enacted in 1981. But these have been both minor and limited to rights obtained in the 
future. Given that the Chilean system incentivized and protects speculation, these non-retro-
active reforms are of limited effect. See Silvia Borzutzky & Elisabeth F. Madden, Markets 
Awash: The Privatization of Chilean Water Markets, 25 J. INT’L DEV. 251 (2013) [hereinafter 
Borzutzky & Madden]. 
 3. Many studies over the past couple of decades demonstrate the potential effects of 
climate change on the Columbia River Basin. Generally speaking, in addition to higher tem-
peratures, we should expect to see more precipitation fall as rain, reduced winter snowpack, 
earlier spring runoff, and lower summer stream flows. The associated social and cultural ef-
fects are more difficult to predict. See Alan F. Hamlet & Dennis P. Lettenmaier, Effects of 
Climate Change on Hydrology and Water Resources in the Columbia River Basin, 35 J. AMER. 
WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 1597 (1999); Jason C. Leppi et al., Impacts of Climate Change on 
August Stream Discharge in the Central-Rocky Mountains, 112 CLIMATIC CHANGE 997 (2012); 
Huan Wu et al., Projected Climate Change Impacts on the Hydrology and Temperature of Pa-
cific Northwest Rivers, 48 WATER RESOURCES RES. W11530 (2012); Julie A. Vano et al., Sea-
sonal Hydrologic Responses to Climate Change in the Paciﬁc Northwest, 51 WATER RESOURCE 
RES. 1959 (2015). 
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development in the two countries. The third section will address 
differences in legal regimes, and the fourth section will address the 
different environmental contexts and effects. Finally, this article 
will conclude with an assessment of what the Chilean experience 
suggests about the future of water resources in the Columbia River 
Basin. 
II. FINDING LESSONS IN THE DIFFERENCES: WHY 
COMPARING CHILE AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 
MAKES SENSE 
Initially, it might seem that Chile and the Columbia River Ba-
sin are too different for any comparison or contrast to offer useful 
lessons. But it is this fact that makes a comparison so interesting 
and potentially useful. Because the two places do share one im-
portant similarity: both Chile and the Columbia River Basin likely 
will experience significant changes in their water regimes and 
their capacity to adapt to these changes over the next decades due 
to climate change. It is precisely those changes that make the com-
parison most useful. A climate change altered Columbia River Ba-
sin will not be the same place in which our water resources history 
and infrastructure developed. It will be different ecologically, hy-
draulically, and maybe eventually, culturally and legally. Looking 
at how other places have developed and adapted to different condi-
tions therefore becomes an important way to imagine different cli-
mate and governance futures. 
A. Climate Change and Altered Hydrologic Regimes 
Researchers at the Climate Impacts Group at the University 
of Washington have demonstrated that changes in both precipita-
tion and temperature have already affected the hydrologic regime 
of the Columbia River Basin.4 These changes are expected to con-
tinue, with most watersheds experiencing a shift from high-eleva-
tion precipitation in the form of snow to rain.5 These climatic 
                                                          
 4. JOHN T. ABATZOGLOU ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE NORTHWEST IMPLICATIONS 
FOR OUR LANDSCAPES, WATERS, AND COMMUNITIES  48 (Meghan M. Dalton, Philip W. Mote & 
Amy K. Snover, eds., Island Press 2013). For more on work done by the Climate Impacts 
Group, see Climate Impacts Group, UNIV. OF WASH. https://cig.uw.edu/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2016). 
 5. The temperature is expected to rise by 2.0°F to 8.5°F from the period from 1970-
1999 to 2041-2070 depending on the model, and annual average precipitation is projected to 
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changes will effectively shift the spring peak flows earlier in the 
season, and decrease late-summer flows.6 The warmer summers 
are, in turn, expected to lengthen the growing season, leading to 
increased water demand from irrigators.7 Hydropower will also be 
affected by the new climate regime, with summer production ex-
pected to decrease by around 15% by 2040, and winter production 
seeing a slight increase of around 5%, not including adjustments 
that will need to be made in flow releases for endangered anadro-
mous fish.8  
Similarly, climate models for Chile suggest significant 
changes in the future. Those models have consistently projected a 
warming and drying trend that will continue through the 21st cen-
tury,9 with severe impacts to agriculture and hydropower.10 The 
Andes have already experienced an increase of 1 to 1.5 °C since 
1900, which is approximately three times the rise in the global-
average temperature.11 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change has also indicated that the precipitation in the Biobío Re-
gion is likely to decrease by 15 to 20 percent by late this century.12 
Furthermore, the Zero Celsius Degree Isotherm (ZDI), which de-
marcates the elevation at which precipitation transitions from rain 
to snow, has increased by an average of twenty-three meters per 
decade since 1958.13 The combination of higher temperatures and 
                                                          
change by -5% to +14% for 2014-2070 with summer rainfall decreasing by up to 34%. 
Abatzoglou, at 33. 
 6.  Id.  
 7. Id. at 47. 
 8. Id. at xxiv-xxv. 
 9. See Margot Hill Clarvis & Andrew Allan, Adaptive capacity in a Chilean context: 
A Questionable Model for Latin America, 43 ENVTL. SCI. AND POL’Y 78, 82 (2013). 
 10. See Bauer, infra note 12, at 645. 
 11. See Margot Hill, Climate Change and Water Governance: Adaptive Capacity in 
Chile and Switzerland, in 54 ADVANCES IN GLOBAL RESEARCH 120 (Martin Beniston, et al., 
eds. Springer Netherlands 2012). 
 12. See Carl J. Bauer, Dams and Markets: Rivers and Electric Power in Chile, 49 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 583, 645 (2009). 
 13. See Rodrigo Valdés-Pineda et al., Water governance in Chile: Availability, Man-
agement, and Climate Change, 519 J. OF HYDROLOGY 2538, 2559 (2014). 
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decreased precipitation will affect both the volume of glaciers and 
snowpack in the Andes, as well as the seasonality of runoff from 
their melting, reducing their ability to serve as “reservoirs” for 
downstream dry-season water use.14 Studies have already demon-
strated glacier shrinkage in Central Chile.15 Chile is also dispro-
portionately affected by natural climatological phenomena such as 
the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (inter-decadal variability) and El 
Niño/La Niña (inter-annual variability), which affect both precipi-
tation and temperature and further complicate climate forecast-
ing.16 A 2009 United Nations Study concluded that the reduction 
in precipitation alone could result in a loss of US$100 million per 
year for hydropower generation.17 
Given the potentially significant changes that climate change 
might cause in ecological, hydrological, and all environmental sys-
tems across the globe, and particularly in snow dominated sys-
tems, the futures of both the Columbia River Basin and Chile 
might be radically different than conditions are today. We there-
fore must be extremely cautious as we think about how what we do 
today might or might not work tomorrow in this “new normal” of 
an altered climate. That is precisely the reason we should look for 
examples of how we might be able to adapt in a climate-altered 
future. In Chile, current conditions—which include relatively less 
winter snow and more winter rain—are a potential analogy for a 
climate altered Columbia River Basin. How Chile adjusts, if it 
does, to climate change thus might provide some useful foreshad-
owing. 
B. United States Analogues to the Biobío 
Even if Chile’s more rain-dominated precipitation regime is 
similar to what we will experience in a climate-altered Columbia 
River Basin, other non-precipitation elements seem rather differ-
ent. So given the obvious cultural, social, legal, and geographical 
differences between Chile and the Columbia River Basin, what 
might Chilean river systems like the Biobío have to say about wa-
ter resources in the Columbia River Basin? From a cultural and 
                                                          
 14. See Clarvis & Allen, supra note 9, at 82. 
 15. See Valdés-Pineda, supra note 13, at 2559. 
 16. See Hill, supra note 11, at 164. 
 17. See Bauer, supra note 12, at 645. 
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economic perspective, the Biobío River is Chile’s most important 
river system, and thus plays a cultural and economic role similar 
to the Columbia River. The Biobío is Chile’s second largest and 
most developed river, flowing through the country’s second largest 
metropolitan area.18 It produces almost 50% of Chile’s hydroelec-
tricity, and nearly 20% of its total electricity.19 
Beyond that very general comparison, finding a U.S. analogue 
for the Biobío is difficult but useful, because the Biobío teaches 
more with its differences than with any apparent similarities. 
Chile is famously narrow, averaging approximately 110 miles in 
width from the peaks of the Andes to the Pacific Ocean, while run-
ning over 2,600 miles north to south—California, in comparison, is 
over twice as wide at 350 miles, but only 770 miles long north to 
south.20 As a result, Chilean rivers are short and steep, dropping 
quickly from the mountains to the central valley and the ocean. Of 
rivers in the western U.S., the Sacramento River is the most simi-
lar, descending rapidly from the Sierra Nevada into the Sacra-
mento Valley. However, the Sacramento Basin is almost three 
times the size of the Biobío Basin, and the Sacramento River itself 
is 70% longer.21 Even with its much larger watershed, the Sacra-
mento’s average annual flow is only two-thirds that of the Biobío.22 
Similarly, compared to Idaho river basins, the Biobío produces 
a very large amount of water in a relatively small area. The mean 
                                                          
 18. Daniel Harris-Pascal, Fluvial Geomorphology of the Bió-Bió basin: Catchment 
Processes and Possible Rehabilitation of Chile’s Second Largest River System, ACADEMIA.EDU 
(Feb. 2014), http://www.academia.edu/11802085/Geomorphology_and_microcatchment_man-
agement_of_the_Bio-Bio_Basin_Chile.   
 19. Chile has several power distribution systems. By far the largest is the Sistema 
Interconectado Central (SIC), which provides power for over 90% of Chile’s citizens. The SIC’s 
installed capacity, including the capacity of each individual power facility, is available here: 
Comision Nacional de Energia, Electridad, CNE.CL, http://www.cne.cl/estadisticas/ener-
gia/electricidad (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).  
 20. Chile, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Chile (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2016); California, WORLD ATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/coun-
trys/namerica/usstates/calandst.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
 21. See Theodore E. Grantham et al., Water management in Mediterranean river ba-
sins: a comparison of management frameworks, physical impacts, and ecological responses, 719 
HYDROBIOLOGIA 451, 455 (2012).  
 22. See id. 
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annual flow at the Biobío’s mouth is about the same as the Snake 
River above Lewiston (about 34,000 cfs).23 But the total size of the 
Biobío basin is just 10% of the Snake River Basin upstream of 
Lewiston.24 That portion of the Upper Snake River Basin above 
Howell’s Ferry near Minidoka drains 15,700 square miles,25 still 
almost 70% larger than the total Biobío Basin. Yet, the Snake 
River’s average annual flow at Howell’s Ferry is just 6,500 cfs, or 
less than 20% of the Biobío’s annual average flow.26 Put another 
way, the Biobío Basin produces almost ten times more water per 
unit area than the Snake River Basin. 
Although the Snake and the Biobío seem to share little in com-
mon, the Snake River Basin’s reservoir storage capacity above 
Howell’s Ferry is approximately the same as the Chilean govern-
ment’s original goal for reservoir storage of the mainstem Biobío 
River—about 4 million acre-feet—and thus the Snake makes for 
an interesting comparison.27 The Biobío River’s three large main-
stem dams currently have a maximum storage capacity of about 
1.2 million acre-feet of water,28 the same as a single reservoir in the 
Upper Snake: Palisades Reservoir, the second largest reservoir in 
                                                          
 23. Harris-Pascal, supra note 18; Stream flow data for the USGS gauge near Ana-
tone, Washington (upstream from Lewiston) dating back to July 1958 is available at: U.S. Ge-
ological Survey, USGS Current Conditions for Idaho, USGS.GOV, http://wa-
terdata.usgs.gov/id/nwis/uv/?site_no=13334300 (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).  
 24. See Harris-Pascal, supra note 18; Stream flow data at Howell’s Ferry near 
Minidoka dates to April 1910, U.S. Geological Survey, NWIS Site Information for USA: Site 
Inventory, USGS.GOV, http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/inventory/?site_no=13081500 (last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter NWIS Site Information]. 
 25. NWIS Site Information, supra note 24. 
 26. U.S. Geological Survey, Water-Year Summary for Site USGS 13081500, 
USGS.GOV, http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/wys_rpt?dv_ts_ids=45445&wys_wa-
ter_yr=2015&site_no=13081500&agency_cd=USGS&adr_water_years=2006%2C2007%2C20
08%2C2009%2C2010%2C2011%2C2012%2C2013%2C2014%2C2015&referred_module= (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Water-Year Summary]; Harris-Pascal, supra note 18. 
 27. See John Sears & Katherine Bragg, Bio-Bio: A River Under Threat, The Ecologist, 
1987, at 15, 16.  
 28. See Chile Hydroelectricitas, ENDESA.CL http://www.endesa.cl/es/conocenos/nues-
tronegocio/centrales/Paginas/chilehidro.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
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that part of the Snake River basin.29 Rivers in the western United 
States are far more developed, and have far greater reservoir stor-
age capacity, than the Biobío, even if their total flows are much 
less. One reason for this is the limited amount of space that exists 
between the Andes and the Pacific Ocean—there simply is not as 
much room for dams and reservoirs. However, the few dams in the 
Biobío River are fairly new and further dam development could re-
sult in the river more closely resembling the overall artificially con-
structed nature of the Snake River.  
III. WATER RESOURCE HISTORIES 
Although it has a relatively shorter experience with European 
settlement and irrigated agriculture—Idaho’s capital city was in-
corporated in 1863,30 more than four centuries after Santiago, 
Chile was founded in 154131—the Columbia River Basin has had 
more substantial experience with large-scale and environmentally-
significant water infrastructure and development. The different 
historical and political experiences of the two places could have sig-
nificant effects on their futures. 
A. “Redemption” of the arid lands—Water resource development 
in the Columbia River Basin 
The Columbia River Basin was developed in a historic moment 
that differs greatly from today’s Biobío Basin in Chile. The New 
Deal and the Federal planning and development of both the hydro-
power and irrigation projects on the Columbia and Snake Rivers 
took place during an “era of profound technological optimism in 
humankind’s ability to control nature.”32 This paradigm resulted 
in the transformation of the natural and ecological processes in the 
                                                          
 29. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, Major Storage Reservoirs 
in the Upper Snake River Basin, USBR.GOV,  http://www.usbr.gov/pn/hydromet/burtea.html 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).  
 30. Idaho Territorial Sesquicentennial, ELMORECOUNTYPRESS.COM, 
http://www.elmorecountypress.com/Hi-Liting%20Idaho.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).  
 31. Santiago, Chile, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/place/Santiago-Chile (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).  
 32. Paul W. Hirt & Adam M. Sowards, The Past and Future of the Columbia River, 
in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED: TRANSBOUNDARY GOVERNANCE IN THE FACE OF 
UNCERTAINTY 116 (Barbara Cosens ed., Or. State Univ. Press 2012).   
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Columbia Basin: the industrialization that its power fueled, and 
the use of irrigation to turn desert into farmland—the creation of 
what historian Richard White has called an “organic machine.”33 
Whether this has been a “success,” and for whom, is a topic for an-
other time, but there is no doubt that nature was transformed on 
a massive scale. In turn, this political culture and management 
paradigm influenced the legal regime that developed—both the 
transboundary Columbia River Treaty (1964) with Canada and 
state and Federal water law prioritize particular uses and inter-
ests in specific locations.34 This includes prioritization of irrigation 
rights in the upriver, Snake River Basin and Columbia Basin Pro-
jects, while at the same time constructing large-scale hydropower 
dams that would not interfere with irrigation, but could even facil-
itate and prioritize it. 
The Columbia River Basin was thus the site of a utopian pro-
ject with a strong Federal government role in regional planning, 
and a vision of social progress that rested on putting the river to 
work.35 The Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 created the Bureau 
of Reclamation and initiated a massive federal effort to irrigate the 
arid West.36 The Federal Water Power Act in 1920 created the Fed-
eral Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission) to license and coordinate the creation of hydroelectric fa-
cilities.37 In addition to these agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers was created in 1802 as a separate branch in the Army.38 It 
largely took over the nation’s flood control responsibilities during 
                                                          
 33. RICHARD WHITE, THE ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA 
RIVER (Hill and Wang 1996).  
 34. Columbia River Treaty, Can.-U.S., Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555. 
 35. DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF 
THE AMERICAN WEST 271–72 (Am. Environmentalism ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1985). 
 36. U.S. Dept. of Interior Bureau of Reclamation, The Bureau of Reclamation: A Very 
Brief History, USBR.GOV, (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.usbr.gov/history/borhist.html.  
 37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 792, 803 (2012). 
 38. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, A Brief History: Introduction, USACE.ARMY.MIL, 
http://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-Corps/Introduction/ (Last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2016). 
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the early 20th Century, incorporating hydropower facilities wher-
ever possible,39 as should be unsurprising given their specific mis-
sions, these agencies were in the business of dam-building. The 
New Deal policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt fueled development in 
the Columbia River Basin, through large-scale planning and devel-
opment that lasted until the 1960s.40 Until the Hells Canyon dam 
complex controversy in the late 1950s, almost all of these projects 
were public projects, perceived to generate economic benefit to the 
greatest number of people in the Pacific Northwest.41 These Fed-
eral projects, in addition to the doctrine of prior appropriation in 
western water law, provided political, legal, and financial power 
for irrigators that lasts to this day. 
To say that the consequences of the dam-building era in the 
Columbia River Basin have been significant is to grossly under-
state the effects. There are now sixty dams in the Columbia River 
Basin, ranging in size from the massive Grand Coulee dam on the 
Columbia to the dozens of small irrigation dams and diversions 
scattered across the basin.42 It is estimated that 55% of historic 
salmon and steelhead spawning habitat has been blocked due to 
dams and other obstructions.43 As alluded to in the previous sec-
tion, compared to the Biobío basin, for example, the Columbia 
River Basin is already largely developed, from a dam building per-
spective. As incidents like the 1975 Teton Dam collapse suggest, 
even if dam building were culturally, politically, or economically 
                                                          
 39. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, A Brief History: Responding to Natural Dis-
asters, USACE.ARMY.MIL, http://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-
Corps/Responding-to-Natural-Disasters/ (Last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
 40. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, A Brief History: Multipurpose Waterway Develop-
ment, USACE.ARMY.MIL, http://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-
Corps/Multipurpose-Waterway-Development/ (Last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
 41. KARL BOYD BROOKS, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE DAMS: THE HELLS CANYON HIGH 
DAM CONTROVERSY (William Cronon ed., 2009).  
 42. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Water Management For The Pacific Northwest 
Reservoir System, http://www.nwd-wc.usace.army.mil/pdf/wmbroch.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 
2016). 
 43. Compilation of Information on Salmon and Steelhead Total Run Size, Catch and 
Hydropower Related Losses in the Upper Columbia River Basin, Above Grand Coulee Dam, 
111, https://www.nwcouncil.org/reports/1985/ucut-fisheries-technical-report/ (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2016).  
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acceptable in the early 21st Century Columbia River Basin, only 
marginal dam sites remain. In fact, as the Elwha and Klamath 
Rivers demonstrate—as well as, to a lesser extent, the simmering 
controversy over the four Lower Snake River dams—the Columbia 
River Basin might now be on a return trajectory from the peak of 
its dam-building era. 
That said, dams and the impacts of the dam-building era are 
still an integral element of the Basin’s legal, cultural, and physical 
landscapes. Legal scholar Charles F. Wilkinson has described the 
legacy of 19th- and early-20th-century natural resource laws as the 
“lords of yesterday.”44 In the western U.S., these pervasive, and in 
many instances “outmoded” laws, policies, and ideas, continue to 
powerfully influence, enable, and constrain us.45 These are laws 
that, according to Wilkinson, “arose under wholly different social 
and economic conditions but that remain in effect due to inertia, 
powerful lobbying forces, and lack of public awareness.”46 A closer 
examination of the legal system demonstrates how this led to the 
differences in development trajectory between the Columbia and 
Snake River Basins in the United States, as well as the Biobío Ba-
sin in Chile. How these “lords of yesterday” will facilitate or pre-
vent adaptation to climate change also touches a deeper point 
about how law itself can facilitate adaptation or resilience.47 
B. Dams and the Engines of Economic Development in Chile 
Whereas much of the development in the western US began 
during the New Deal era, a significant amount of economic devel-
opment in Chile occurred under the Pinochet and Concertación 
governments between 1973 and 2010.48 This rapid growth led to 
                                                          
 44. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE WEST 17 (1992). 
 45. Id. at xiii. 
 46. Id. at 17. 
 47. Barbara Cosens, et al., The Adaptive Water Governance Project: Assessing Law, 
Resilience and Governance in Regional Socio-Ecological Water Systems Facing a Changing 
Climate: Introduction to NREL Edition of the Idaho Law Review, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 27 (2014). 
 48. Rapid economic development during this period is demonstrated by the 6.2% real 
yearly growth in gross domestic product (GDP) between 1980 and 2010. See Valdés-Pineda, 
supra note 13, at 2544. “In 1990, Chile finally returned to an elected democratic government. 
Since then, the country has been governed by a coalition of center-left political parties known 
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Chile becoming the first country in South America, and only the 
second country in Latin America, to join the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2010.49 The 
OECD is considered to be an “elite grouping of ‘democratic’ and 
‘developed’ states”.50 
However, unlike the U.S. approach to infrastructure develop-
ment, with the direct and significant involvement of the central 
government, Chile has relied on laws and subsidies that promoted 
private sector development and free market principles. Unlike 
other Andean states, Chile is considered to have “strong institu-
tions, low corruption, and stable politics,” thus supporting the lev-
els of private investment required to support large infrastructure 
projects.51 Chile’s success with this approach has resulted in a com-
paratively large middle class and “relatively high levels of wealth 
and urbanization” as compared to its Andean counterparts.52 
But despite its appearances of stability on the surface, Chile 
has an economic vulnerability in the fact that its economy is almost 
entirely based on natural resource exports.53 Furthermore, approx-
imately three-fourths of Chile’s economic productivity is water in-
tensive.54 As such, the rapid economic and social growth of the past 
                                                          
these dramatic political advances, however, the four successive governments of the Concer-
tación have had to maintain core elements of the institutional legacy of military rule—in par-
ticular the 1980 Constitution and the neoliberal economic model.” See Bauer, supra note 12, 
at 595. The Chilean Concertación (the Concert of Parties for Democracy) held power from the 
end of the Pinochet regime in 1990 until Piñera’s victory over Eduardo Frei in 2010. See Kevin 
Funk, “Today There Are No Indigenous People” in Chile?: Connecting the Mapuche Struggle to 
Anti-Neoliberal Mobilizations in South America. 4 J. OF POL. IN LATIN AMERICA 125, 134 n. 8 
(2012). 
 49. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Members and partners, OECD.ORG 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
 50. See Funk, supra note 48, at 126.  
 51. See Javiera Barandiaran, Chile’s Environmental Assessments: Contested 
Knowledge in an Emerging Democracy, 24 SCIENCE AS CULTURE 5 (2015). 
 52. It is important to note that despite the level of development, Chile continues to 
maintain an extremely high level of income inequality, more than any other OECD country. 
See Funk, supra note 48, at 129. 
 53. See HILL, supra note 11, at 165. 
 54. Id. 
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decades has resulted in increasing demands for surface and ground 
water to the point that water resources in the northern half of 
Chile are almost fully allocated to economic activities.55 In 2006, 
for example, water use reached 4,710 cubic meters per second, 89% 
of which corresponded to non-consumptive uses (primarily irriga-
tion).56 The Chilean government currently has plans to increase 
the country’s irrigated area by 57% by 2022, reaching 1.7 million 
hectares.57 
In the Biobío Region, development has been based around ag-
riculture, forestry, fishing, and previously, coal mining.58 Approxi-
mately 705 square kilometers of the Biobío River Basin is used for 
irrigated agriculture, which accounts for about 70% of the net total 
water withdrawals in the basin.59 Primarily an industrial agricul-
ture zone, the basin is dominated by dairy farms, sugar beets, and 
maize and other feed crops for dairy cattle.60 The forestry sector 
accounts for over 4,600 square kilometers of the Biobío Basin.61 Re-
gional forestry production volume increased by 1.3 million m3 be-
tween 2004 and 2010, and now accounts for 57% of the national 
forestry production and 77% of all regional exports.62 Not only is it 
important to consider the effects of these artificial forests on the 
hydrological cycle, but forest plantations have also displaced irri-
gated agriculture in some areas of the Basin63 and are taking ad-
vantage of better soil quality and moisture content. 
                                                          
 55. See Valdés-Pineda, supra note 13, at 2544. 
 56. Id. at 2546. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Robinson Torres et al., Vulnerability and Resistance to Neoliberal Environ-
mental Changes: An Assessment of Agriculture and Forestry in the Biobío Region of Chile 
(1974–2014), 60 GEOFORUM 107, 111 (2015). 
 59. See Grantham, supra note 21, at 455, 458. 
 60. See Torres, supra note 58, at 112–113. 
 61. See Grantham, supra note 21, at 455. 
 62. See Gonzalo Falabella & Francisco Gatica, Sector forestal-celulosa, agricultura de 
secano e industria en el Gran Concepción:¿ encadenamiento productivo o enclave?, REVISTA 
CEPAL 197, 200 (Apr. 2014) http://www.cepal.org/publica-
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The rise in social and economic development in Chile also re-
sulted in greater demands for energy. Chile’s federal Electric Law 
requires that the most economical forms of energy production be 
used first.64 With low domestic fossil fuel resources, and thus high 
costs for those resources, hydropower is the most stable form of en-
ergy available for base-loading the growing power system.65 Alt-
hough initial investment in building a dam is usually higher than 
thermal power plants, the fuel for hydropower (water) is local, re-
newable, and costs little to nothing.66 Thanks to the Andes, Chile 
does have water resource options: it is ranked 20th globally in the 
availability of water resources,67 making hydropower an attractive 
option for both the public and private sectors. Given the high costs 
of fossil fuels and the apparent availability of water, additional hy-
dropower development is an important consideration for the future 
needs of Chile, which saw a doubling in electricity prices between 
2006 and 2013.68 
Most of Chile’s early dams were built primarily for irrigation 
and were completed under the auspices of State agencies.69 How-
ever, privatization of the energy sector in Chile, along with the 
push for further energy development during the last several dec-
ades, has resulted in the construction of additional dams for the 
combined uses of irrigation and hydropower, as well as several 
                                                          
 64. See Bauer, supra note 12, at 620. 
 65. A shift toward natural gas occurred during the 1990’s with the development of 
combined-cycle technologies and the availability of natural gas from Argentina but economic 
issues in Argentina and an inability to develop agreements with other South American coun-
tries has contributed to price increases for natural gas supplies to Chile. Id. at 628. 
 66. Id. at 608. 
 67. See Valdés-Pineda, supra note 13, at 2538. 
 68. Ministerio de Energía, Agenda de Energía: un Desafío País, Progreso Para Todos, 
MINISTERIO DE ENERGIA 12–13 (May 2014), http://www.cumplimiento.gob.cl/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/03/AgendaEnergiaMAYO2014_FINAL.pdf. 
 69. See Valdés-Pineda, supra note 13, at 2546. 
254 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
dams recently constructed solely for hydropower production by pri-
vate companies.70 Although nearly all of the dams recently con-
structed have been run-of-the-river dams with minimal storage,71 
the increased reliance on water for economic productivity, urbani-
zation, and hydropower, as well as the interactions between them, 
have made Chile vulnerable to changes in the hydrological cycle.72 
The most significant difference between Chile and the Colum-
bia River Basin, with respect to water infrastructure is that most 
of the major infrastructure projects in the Columbia River Basin 
were the result of massive public investments and continue to be 
managed by government agencies accountable to the public. In the 
Biobío Basin, the three largest dams—Ralco, Pangue, and An-
gostura—were all built, and are owned and operated, by multi-na-
tional corporations.73 Even those projects that were originally pub-
lic—like the El Toro facility in the Laja River Basin (the Laja is the 
Biobío’s largest tributary)—were privatized in the decades follow-
ing the 1973 coup.74 The Chilean infrastructure is thus not subject 
                                                          
 70. Id. 
 71. See Carl J. Bauer, Water Conflicts and Entrenched Governance Problems in 
Chile’s Market Model, 8 WATER ALTERNATIVES 147, 157 (2015). 
 72. See HILL, supra note 11, at 101.  
 73. Ralco and Pangue are owned and operated by Endesa Chile S.A. Endesa Chile 
S.A., Conózcanos: Chile Hidroeléctricas ENDESA, http://www.endesa.cl/es/conocenos/nues-
tronegocio/centrales/Paginas/chilehidro.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). Endesa Chile operates 
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CH#horizontalTabRI3 (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). Colbún, which owns and operates the An-
gostura hydroelectric facility, is a publicly traded company operating in Chile and Peru. 
Colbún, Interactive Map, COLBÚN, http://www.colbun.cl/en/energia/mapa-interactivo/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2016). Colbún is owned by a variety of subsidiary corporations. Bolsa Comercio 
Santiago, Stock Summary: Colubn S.A., BOLSADESANTIAGO.COM, http://inter.bolsadesanti-
ago.com/sitios/en/mercado/Paginas/Resumen-de-Instru-
mento.aspx?NEMO=COLBUN#horizontalTabRI3 (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).  
 74. See Grantham, supra note 21, at 462. 
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to the same public interest demands as most of the water system 
in the Columbia River Basin. 
With respect to this single element, the Columbia River Basin 
might seem to be better situated to respond to a changing climate 
and the hydrological, ecological, and cultural changes that might 
follow. While there are consistent, and perhaps well-founded, crit-
icisms of government bureaucracy and management, government 
agencies can better consider the wide variety of communities af-
fected by water resource management. Private corporations, at 
least under current legal regimes, are not obligated to consider the 
same range of issues, nor do they have the same management di-
rectives and goals. 
But it is possible that could change. The United States is no 
longer in the business of large-scale investments in public works. 
And, in fact, there are consistent, and consistently loud, voices call-
ing for reduced investments, privatization of public resources, and 
a greater reliance on private markets generally.75 In fact, with re-
spect to dam construction, the transition to a reliance on private, 
rather than public, investment has already occurred.76 
So, while it is impossible to predict climate change’s economic 
and cultural effects, the United States is already on a multi-decade 
journey away from the ideals of the New Deal. It is possible, per-
haps even likely, that public ownership and control of water re-
sources infrastructure could decline, leading to a future with di-
minished consideration for the multitude of water-related values 
and interests affected by management of the Columbia River Ba-
sin. 
IV. LEGAL REGIMES REGULATING WATER RESOURCES 
One interesting aspect of Chile’s water resources regime is 
that it was influenced by economists and other specialists trained 
in the United States. For those not familiar with water law in the 
western United States, Chile’s water code likely does seem very 
American, with a focus on private rights and the free market. How-
ever, there are significant differences between water regimes in 
the two countries that have real consequences on the ground. And 
                                                          
 75. For an overview of both US and global trends towards neoliberalism see generally 
DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005).  
 76. See generally KARL BOYD BROOKS, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE DAMS: THE HELLS 
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those differences are particularly important when there are con-
flicts between irrigators and the operators of hydroelectric facili-
ties. 
A. Prior Appropriation and Dam Building 
The western United States presented water allocation prob-
lems unknown in the eastern and midwestern states. More than 
any other feature, the interior West is defined by its aridity. This 
aridity, combined with wildly fluctuating snow-dominated water 
flow regimes, yields an inconsistent, and perhaps insufficient, wa-
ter supply. In addition, the primary economic activities in the early 
West were mining and irrigation-dominated agriculture. Both ac-
tivities require moving water from its natural course to the location 
of use, often far removed from the streambed.77 The riparian allo-
cation regime used in the East—which grants water rights to the 
owners of riparian lands—proved incapable of effectively allocat-
ing water in western environmental and economic conditions.78 
Based largely on the extra-legal water codes that developed in 
mining camps, most states enacted a “first in time, first in right” 
rule for appropriation of water.79 This approach assured the first 
person to appropriate water and apply it to a beneficial use a legal 
right to continued use of that water. That legal right was crucial in 
settings that required large investments of time and energy in wa-
ter infrastructure. However, although prior appropriation does 
grant significant rights to private individuals, those rights are not 
unlimited. The rights allocated in a prior appropriation system 
generally require the continued use of the water as originally ap-
propriated.80 In other words, the water must be used on the same 
land, for the same purpose, during the same time period.81 Changes 
in use are possible, although difficult, requiring a demonstration 
                                                          
 77. WILKINSON, supra note 44, at 232. 
 78. WORSTER, supra note 35, at 88–90. 
 79. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 44; WORSTER, supra note 35. These authors 
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that no other water users will be harmed by the change.82 There-
fore, although the system is extremely flexible on the front end, as 
water (if available) is granted to whomever first puts it to a bene-
ficial use, it is much less flexible later and can respond to changed 
conditions only with difficulty. 
While it served a purpose, prior appropriation has obvious 
drawbacks, perhaps none more significant than the unnecessarily 
haphazard way it was implemented on the ground. Charles Wil-
kinson criticizes this aspect of prior appropriation, saying that it 
was “laissez-faire policy in the extreme; public resources were 
thrown open to virtually unfettered private exploitation” without 
any planning or consideration of public or environmental needs. 83 
This problem continues today, as water managers have very lim-
ited capacity to consider the public interest or ecological services 
in allocating water during times of shortage—first in time means 
first in right, even if the use that was first in time is of much lesser 
public benefit. 
Yet despite this criticism, prior appropriation did encourage 
large water management projects in the form of special irrigation 
districts, or “corporate-administrative bodies to hold and distribute 
water.”84 Prior appropriation also attempted to address the ex-
treme fluctuation in river flows in the arid west, by ensuring those 
that had invested in water appropriation would continue to receive 
it.85 However, this oversimplified rule does not take into account 
the complexity of nature, especially ground and surface water con-
nection, leading to conflict over the “hydrological commons” in 
many regions, including the Snake River Basin.86 
While western water law was developing through appropria-
tion and application, planning for water allocation at the basin-
scale was also being implemented. General John Wesley Powell 
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 83. WILKINSON, supra note 44, at 240. 
 84. Id. at 241. 
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was perhaps the first to advocate for basin-scale planning, irriga-
tion, and reclamation projects.87 His ideas were initially ignored, 
and political subdivisions largely avoided the more obvious and 
sensible watershed boundaries in exchange for straight lines and 
right angles.88 But ultimately the reality on the ground supported 
Powell’s argument that western water allocation would require 
large-scale planning and infrastructure development. As discussed 
above, Congress passed the Newlands Reclamation Act in 1902, 
which provided funding for the development of large-scale irriga-
tion and hydroelectric projects across the West.89 
The Reclamation Act enabled a significant social and ecologi-
cal transformation of western water basins. As Mark Fiege re-
counts in Irrigated Eden, in the early 1900s, irrigation advocates 
began to promote their vision of an “irrigated Eden,” where farmers 
would “laugh at the cloudless skies.”90 Settlers were already irri-
gating farmland upstream of American Falls in southeast Idaho in 
the late 1800s, but the Reclamation Act radically expanded irriga-
tion capacity.91 Approved in 1904 as one of the first reclamation 
projects, the Minidoka Project ultimately constructed five storage 
dams and thousands of miles of canals to irrigate over one million 
acres of farmland in southern and southeastern Idaho.92 That de-
velopment enticed a stream of migrants to the area, and by 1910, 
the population of Idaho had risen to over 325,000, more than dou-
bling the population of just ten years earlier.93 These farmers, alt-
hough at times likely thinking that they were working with nature, 
were mostly working to radically alter the hydrologic cycle of the 
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Snake River, as they created hundreds of small dams, ditches, and 
canals to divert water to their fields.94 
As the Bureau of Reclamation became more involved, those ef-
fects increased by orders of magnitude.95 From the very beginnings 
of the modern dam-building era, major dams served two purposes 
wherever possible—irrigation and hydroelectricity. In the 
Minidoka Project, the two largest structures—the Minidoka Dam 
and American Falls Dam—both contain hydroelectric facilities, 
with the first power from the project coming online in 1909.96 
Across the Columbia River Basin, dam designs incorporated both 
uses from the beginning. Perhaps the best example is the Columbia 
Basin Project and massive Grand Coulee Dam, which provide both 
over 6,000 megawatts of electricity and irrigate almost 700,000 
acres of farmland.97 
From a legal perspective then, the primary elements of the wa-
ter resources landscape in the Columbia River Basin are prior ap-
propriation and a massive public involvement in irrigation and hy-
droelectric facilities. Although both elements serve both irrigation 
and hydroelectricity, which both need secure rights to water that 
can be stored and used when needed, there is nothing about the 
uses themselves that are inherently mutually supporting. Water 
that is being passed through a turbine cannot be stored or diverted 
from the reservoir for agricultural uses. If water is needed both for 
storage and power production simultaneously, prior appropriation 
can allocate water. But since it allocates absolute rights (i.e., all of 
a senior users’ rights must be satisfied before the junior can exer-
cise its rights) it cannot avoid the conflict. When there is insuffi-
cient water to serve both users, one user necessarily will lose. 
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B. Chilean Water Law and the Private Market 
Water law in the western United States emerged very early in 
its settlement history. It also emerged somewhat organically as a 
reaction to local climatic, hydrological, and ecological needs. Most 
of western settlement and development occurred after legal struc-
tures were in place to allocate water rights.98 In contrast, although 
Chilean water law has existed in some form for centuries,99 Chile 
enacted its current market-based water code in 1981, well after 
much of the country had already been developed for agricultural 
purposes.100 The code also applies in the same fashion throughout 
the country, independent of the widely varying local conditions. 
And Chile’s water code was not a reaction to local climatic, hydro-
logical, and ecological needs. Instead, it emerged to serve a partic-
ular political agenda that was unrelated to conditions on the 
ground.101 
Because Chile developed its current water code at a time when 
it was reasonable to anticipate large-scale hydropower develop-
ment, the system distinguished between consumptive rights (wa-
ter that would be removed from the channel and consumed) and 
non-consumptive rights (water that would remain in the chan-
nel).102 For example, irrigation is a consumptive right, while rights 
for hydroelectric facilities are non-consumptive, given that the wa-
ter theoretically remains within or returns to the watercourse.103 
Of course, some of the water diverted for irrigation returns to the 
stream, and hydroelectric facilities lose significant amounts of wa-
ter through evaporation and infiltration from storage reservoirs,104 
so the distinction may be more legal than real. 
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The establishment of non-consumptive rights in the Chilean 
Water Code was specifically intended to promote hydroelectric de-
velopment, while still ostensibly protecting the consumptive rights 
of irrigators and other water users downstream.105 According to 
Chile’s Water Code, non-consumptive rights can be granted after 
consumptive rights, so long as the use of the water does not preju-
dice the rights of third parties to the same water, either in quantity 
or opportunity of use (among other things).106 Because the largest 
Biobío dams are relatively new, this provision theoretically should 
protect the pre-existing rights of downstream irrigators. 
But as is often the case, both politics and economics can influ-
ence legal reasoning.107 Conflicts related to the relative priorities 
of consumptive rights and later non-consumptive rights reached 
the Chilean Supreme Court in the early 1990’s. In 1990, in the 
Maule River Basin, a new dam (the Pehuenche Hyrdoelectric 
Plant) had disrupted the water supply to downstream, pre-existing 
consumptive rights holders. Notwithstanding the statutory provi-
sion apparently guaranteeing that non-consumptive uses could not 
interfere with consumptive rights, the hydropower facility claimed 
that inherent in the non-consumptive right is the right to fill an 
associated reservoir allowing use of the non-consumptive right, 
whatever the impact on downstream users. The lower courts found 
for the downstream users on several occasions, but the Chilean Su-
preme Court repeatedly overturned those lower court decisions 
                                                          
lectric facilities use, on average, 40 times more water per kilowatt hour produced than do ther-
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while refusing to rule on the crucial substantive issue regarding 
priority.108 
In a subsequent case challenging water use by the Pangue Hy-
droelectric Facility on the Biobío, the Chilean Supreme Court fi-
nally confronted the substantive issue.109 Pangue was much more 
controversial than the Pehuenche facility in the Maule Basin, in 
part because it would displace, and have significant effects on na-
tive Pewenche communities.110 Opponents argued that a non-con-
sumptive right did not include the right to alter water flows with-
out concern for the effects on downstream consumptive rights hold-
ers.111 The Chilean Supreme Court, ignoring its previous support 
for the property rights of irrigators, and the apparently clear lan-
guage of the statute, ruled in favor of the hydroelectric facility.112 
Combined, these cases potentially demonstrate an apparent 
judicial preference—at least in the early 1990s—for hydroelectric 
facilities over irrigation, notwithstanding the apparent require-
ments of the Water Code. The first case on the Maule River in-
volved a large, conventional reservoir dam with a storage capacity 
of 1,544 million cubic meters of water.113 After dam construction 
was complete, the dam gates were completely closed to fill the res-
ervoir in November (Chilean irrigation season), which completely 
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Pacific Northwest Region Storage Reservoirs in the Upper Snake River Basin, BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/pn/hydromet/burtea.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2015). 
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cut off all flow in the river to downstream users.114 Downstream 
water users thus suffered an obvious and clear harm, but the Chil-
ean Supreme Court refused to “rule on the issue and persuaded 
both parties to settle the matter through private arbitration.”115 
Thus, notwithstanding what appeared to be a violation of the Wa-
ter Code resulting in an obvious economic harm, the Supreme 
Court left the downstream irrigators without a legal remedy. 
The conflict at the Pangue Dam reinforces this sense that the 
Chilean government preferred hydropower. Pangue sits relatively 
high on the Biobío, above all of the irrigators in the basin. 116 It is 
also designed exclusively for hydropower, 117 as a run-of-the-river 
operation118 with 175 million cubic meters of storage capacity.119 
Once operational, run-of-the-river operations have relatively lim-
ited effects on downstream water supply.120 Although day-to-day 
peaking operations can cause rapid fluctuations in flows, the pri-
mary impact of Pangue on the water supply available to down-
stream users would have been when the reservoir was initially 
filled.121 
                                                          
114. See Coleman, supra note 105, at 15.  Minimum ecological flows for new dam pro-
jects were not required until the passage of the 2005 Water Code Amendments. Borzutsky & 
Madden, supra note 2, at 258.   
115. See Coleman, supra note 105, at 15. 
116. A map of all irrigation canal systems in the Region can be found on the Chile 
Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resources Information Center website. Ministerio de Ag-
ricultura, Red de Canales Región del Bío-Bío, CIREN, http://comercial.ciren.cl/im-
ages/pdf/PDF_VIII/red_canales_08.pdf. 
117. See Valdés-Pineda et al., supra note 13, at 2546. 
118. “Run-of-the-river hydropower plants have the lowest operating costs. Since the 
water flowing by or through them cannot be stored, it must be used or it is lost. As a result, 
these generators are always operating whenever there is water. They provide part of the SIC’s 
baseline power supplies.” See Bauer, supra note 12, at 621. 
119. Although Pangue is a large structure, at 113 meters tall, its reservoir is relatively 
small. It has approximately the storage capacity of Island Park Reservoir on the Henrys Fork 
in the Upper Snake River Basin, but it can only story 12% of the capacity of Palisades Reser-
voir or 8% of the capacity of American Falls Reservoir, both on the Snake River. 
120. Bauer, supra note 12, at 608.  
121. See generally García et al., Downstream Environmental Effects of Dam Opera-
tions: Changes in Habitat Quality for Native Fish Species 27 RIVER RES. & APPLICATIONS 
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In 1993, when the Supreme Court was hearing the case, the 
dam was not yet constructed. Thus, unlike the Colbún conflict, 
where the dam had already caused demonstrable harm, with 
Pangue, the irrigators were arguing about potential loss of water 
in the future.122 As a run-of-the-river dam with a small reservoir, 
Pangue lacks the capacity to store large quantities of water.  Thus, 
unlike more predictable storage reservoirs in snow-dominated sys-
tems, those which capture and release water on somewhat more 
knowable schedules, Pangue would have potentially significant ef-
fects on downstream water users at sporadic and unpredictable 
times, as it alters river flows on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis 
to take advantage of favorable market conditions.123 Because Chil-
ean water use conflicts fall under civil law, rather than adminis-
trative law, the burden of proof to demonstrate harm was on the 
downstream irrigators.124 Relying on reports from the Dirreción 
General de Aguas, the Chilean administrative agency tasked with 
managing the water rights system, the Chilean Supreme Court de-
termined that any potential effects were questionable and uncer-
tain.125 The court did determine that irrigators could bring dam-
ages claims later, should damages arise.126 But the limited storage 
capacity of a run-of-the-river dam, and thus the relatively limited, 
unpredictable, and inconsistent effects on water flow, and perhaps 
the geographical layout –which includes multiple large tributaries 
downstream of Pangue that contribute to and alter the river’s flow 
regime –potentially make demonstrating those future damages dif-
ficult. 
Combined, these cases suggest a potential preference for hy-
droelectric development over irrigation uses. The Court refused to 
acknowledge a clear, present harm, and even when it recognized 
harm that might occur, it put off considering that harm to a point 
                                                          
(2011) for a demonstration of hydro-peaking in the Biobío River upstream of the irrigators due 
to the operations of the dams.     
122. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 8 mayo 1993, “Orrego c. 
Empresa Eléctrica Pangue,” (Chile). 
123. See generally Garcia, supra note 121. 
124. See Bauer, supra note 12, at 599. 
125. See Coleman, supra note 105, at 16. 
126. Id.  
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at which it might be difficult to prevent or remedy.  But it is im-
portant to note that these cases occurred at a time of political tran-
sition.127 General Pinochet had only given up the presidency a few 
years earlier, in 1990, and remained in charge of the country’s mil-
itary.128 Many of the country’s judges and justices would have been 
benefactors of the Pinochet regime and might have felt pressures 
from a number of sources to continue the policies of that regime. 
But while the politics of these decisions certainly suggest a contin-
ued preference for hydropower development, neither the Colbún 
nor Pangue decisions necessarily have any legal effect on future 
conflicts. In the Chilean civil law system, case law precedent has a 
different effect than it does in the United States.129 The Chilean 
Supreme Court is not bound by its previous decisions in the same 
fashion, and the Court’s opinions may evolve more readily over 
time.130 More recent Supreme Court rulings suggest that the Chil-
ean Supreme Court may be willing, now that it is more distanced 
from the Pinochet regime, to carefully consider public rights. Two 
recent cases, although not dealing with hydroelectric facilities, nor 
addressing conflicts over consumptive versus non-consumptive 
rights, provide evidence of a potential transition in the Chilean Su-
preme Court’s approach to water resource disputes.  
For example, in Chile’s Coquimbo Region, about 150 miles 
north of Santiago, the El Mauro tailings dam blocks the Pupio 
River. The dam is just upstream from a small community of Cai-
manes, with approximately 2,000 inhabitants.131 In 2008, citizens 
of Caimanes brought a claim before the courts that the ongoing 
construction of El Mauro132 affected both the quantity and quality 
                                                          
127. Bauer, supra note 71, at 151.     
128. Id.  
129. See Pablo Bravo-Hurtado, Hacia los precedentes en Chile: Reforma procesal civil 
y fuentes del Derecho, 40 REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 549 (2013). 
130. Id. 
131. See Florian Lehne, Caimanes and the Water-Infinite Legal Struggles about a Fi-
nite Good, 3.1 FUTURE OF FOOD: J. ON FOOD, AGRIC. & SOC’Y 94–95 (2015). 
132. Id. at 97 (The tailings dam has been in place for decades. One interesting aspect 
of the case is that it required characterization of the dam as a “new construction.” The Chilean 
Supreme Court determined that, because tailings are continually added, it constitutes new 
construction). 
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of their water.133 In 2014, the Chilean Supreme Court issued a rul-
ing that the defendant, Los Pelambres, S.A., was required to re-
store the natural course of the water in the Pupio Valley.134 Alt-
hough this case is about water and the effects of the dam on the 
ability of the citizens of Caimanes to use the water, it was grounded 
primarily in Chile’s environmental laws, rather than in its water 
code.135 The Court used water pollution, rather than water rights, 
to find for Caimanes.136 It is of note then that in April 2015, an 
appellate court in La Serena determined that the tailings dam was 
not polluting water used in Caimanes.137 An appeal of the original 
order to remove the dam remains pending,138 but, because the orig-
inal case was about water quality (rather than quantity), this later 
finding could defeat the citizens’ claims. 
Another recent water rights dispute in the semi-arid region of 
Northern Chile pitted indigenous communities against a private 
water bottling company, Agua Mineral Chusmiza SAIC.139 The in-
digenous communities contended that the company’s use of water 
was depriving them of their water rights under the International 
Labour Organization Convention 169 (Indigenous and Tribal Peo-
ples Convention), ratified by Chile in 2008.140 Although the com-
pany’s rights were registered and communities’ rights were not, in 
2009 the Supreme Court granted part of the flow to the indigenous 
                                                          
133. Id. at 96 (The applicants further argued that the dam was “hampering the com-
munity be creating a considerable risk for the maintaining of natural resources, mainly the 
human consumption of drinking water and the use of water as means of production, thereby 
perturbing natural riverbeds and affecting social goods…, as is living in an environment free 
from contamination guaranteed by Article 19 No. 8 Chilean Constitution”). 
134. See id. at 97. 
135. See id. at 98. 
136. Id. at 97–98. 
137. Chile Court Rules Tailings Dam for Antofagasta’s Los Pelambres Mine Safe, 
REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://af.reuters.com/article/metalsNews/idAFL1N0XJ31J20150422. 
138. Id. 
139. Agua Mineral Chusmiza Lawsuit (re Chile), BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/agua-mineral-chusmiza-lawsuit-re-chile (last visited Sep. 
14, 2016). 
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communities under the ILO Convention and the Chilean Indige-
nous Peoples’ Act, recognizing their ancestral water rights, while 
also recognizing the co-existent rights of the company under the 
Water Code.141 Although unrelated to dams, this ruling also af-
firmed the rights of downstream communities to claim water, and 
it empowered indigenous rights, despite a potential impact to eco-
nomic development.  
These two cases do not address conflicts between hydroelectric 
facilities and irrigators, nor do they address the question of priority 
between consumptive and non-consumptive rights.142 And both 
cases are grounded primarily in other legal regimes, rather than 
in the Water Code alone.143 Thus their capacity to suggest a new 
approach to resolving conflicts like Pangue and Colbún is some-
what limited. But notwithstanding those differences, the cases do 
demonstrate that the Chilean legal system is beginning to take a 
more holistic approach to addressing economic development and 
environmental harm. They also suggest that the Court may have 
moved past its early-1990s discomfort with addressing water or en-
vironmental issues.  
Although the distinction—or more accurately, the application 
of the distinction—between consumptive and non-consumptive 
uses is, to some extent, at the heart of the conflicts between irriga-
tors and hydroelectric facilities, it is not the only interesting aspect 
of Chile’s Water Code. In fact, there are aspects of the Chilean wa-
ter rights system that might provide some flexibility in the future 
as the country tries to address changing hydrological, ecological, 
and climatic conditions. 
When the new Water Code was first enacted in Chile, the DGA 
was authorized to approve all water rights applications, without 
fees, as long as the water was legally unclaimed and physically 
available, regardless of the intended use.144 Whenever two or more 
requests are received for the same water right simultaneously, a 
                                                          
141. Id.  
142. See id.  
143. See id. 
144. See Coleman, supra note 105, at 14. 
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public auction is held,145 and the DGA cannot privilege one use or 
user over another in the process.146 Once granted by the DGA, 
these private property rights can “be bought, sold, transferred, 
rented, or inherited at the owner’s discretion,”147 as well as mort-
gaged like other real estate.148 Unlike water rights laws in the 
western US, there is no “use it or lose it” requirement,149 nor is 
there a “beneficial use” requirement.150 There is also no tax or fee 
for either the water right or use, and the type of use can almost 
always be changed at any time without notification or approval by 
the DGA.151 As noted previously, the goal of this system was to cre-
ate a private market in water rights.  
At least in the abstract, the benefit of Chile’s private market 
approach is that it allows water rights to be transferred to the 
places and uses where they will be of most economic value, with 
the opportunity for low transaction cost trading and the quick re-
sponses needed to adapt to fluctuations in water availability.152 
But in practice, Chile’s water markets only operate in specific ar-
eas under a narrow set of cultural and economic conditions, and 
the theoretical benefits of private water markets have not 
emerged.153 In fact, most assessments of the system have been crit-
ical, from a variety of perspectives.154 However, legal reforms in 
                                                          
145. See José Ignacio Morán, Water Legislation in Chile: The Need for Reform, 
http://global.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=applica-
tion%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1247756543247&ssbi-
nary=true. 
146. See Paul Lewin, Análisis de la Eficiencia del Mercado de Derechos de 
Aprovechamiento de Aguas en Chile, SANTIAGO 9 (Enero 2003), http://econ-
wpa.repec.org/eps/othr/papers/0503/0503005.pdf.  
147. See Coleman, supra note 105, at 14. 
148. See Bauer, supra note 12, at 598. 
149. See Morán, supra note 145. 
150. See Bauer, supra note 12, at 599. 
151. Id. 
152. See Borzutzky & Madden, supra note 2, at 25966. 
153. See id. at 258. 
154. See id. See also Clarvis, supra note 9; Bauer, supra note 12. 
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2005 removed some of the obstacles to active water markets,155 and 
the level of autonomy provided for individual rights-holders in 
Chile provides for the potential economic freedom necessary to pur-
sue water trading should conditions allow.156 Thus, although the 
Chilean water system has yet to achieve the efficiency first imag-
ined when it was first created by neoliberal economists in 1981, it 
does appear that some flexibility does exist to react to changing 
conditions, even if this flexibility has yet to be realized in any sig-
nificant way. Of course, as is the case with all market-based sys-
tems, values such as environmental or cultural values that are dif-
ficult to account for, or perceive of economically, could lose out in 
this system. 
This market-based approach is not the only way in which the 
Chilean system attempted to create flexibility. In apparent con-
trast to the overall, do-whatever-you-want-with-your-right ap-
proach suggested above, the Water Code created many different 
types of water rights classifications beyond consumptive and non-
consumptive distinction discussed previously. Water rights can be 
classified as permanent, eventual (when there is surplus),157 con-
tinuous (uninterrupted), discontinuous (periodic), or alternating 
(when two or more users take turns).158 Any of these rights can also 
be further partitioned among several users and/or split with re-
spect to continuity so that each user holds a right to discontinuous 
use.159 One other category, provisional rights, exists for restricted 
zones, which require proof of no impact to the water supply for a 
period of five years before the DGA will convert them to permanent 
rights.160 All of these rights are measured in volume per unit 
time.161 As climate change reduces the availability of water, it is 
                                                          
155. See Borzutzky & Madden, supra note 2, at 25659. 
156. See Hill, supra note 11, at 302. 
157. Article 18 of the Water Code expressly prohibits eventual rights from being allo-
cated for reservoirs. See id. at 142. 
158. See Valdés-Pineda, supra note 13, at 2549. 
159. See Lewin, supra note 146, at 8. 
160. See Hill, supra note 11, at 142. 
161. See Lewin, supra note 146, at 7. 
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possible that these various rights categories could create opportu-
nities to improve the efficiency in water use and reduce the impact 
to individual water users. 
Unlike most water allocation regimes in the Western United 
States, where a state agency or specialized court manages water 
rights, the Chilean system is much more decentralized. The DGA 
performs functions for water basins such as planning, investiga-
tion, protection, and development, as well as the granting of water 
rights and approval of major hydraulic works.162 However, their 
role in the management of water use is limited to cases of extreme 
drought, when they are able to intervene in water distribution for 
a maximum, non-renewable, period of six months.163 Instead, pri-
vate local water use organizations (WUO), which have existed for 
about 200 years, manage water resources, resolve conflict, and fa-
cilitate water trading among members on a local scale.164 These or-
ganizations also share costs for the construction and maintenance 
of infrastructure, while facilitating communication and trading ac-
tivity.165 
The Chilean WUOs are very similar to the canal companies, 
irrigation districts, traditional acequias, Mormon cooperatives, or 
other similar cooperative efforts that have been used across the 
Western United States. In times of short-term water shortage or 
inter-day variability, the WUOs are able to adapt through local 
                                                          
162. See Morán, supra note 145. 
163. See id. Resolution No.674 (2012) establishes the parameters under which the 
DGA can recommend that a drought period (not to exceed 6 months) be declared by the Presi-
dent under Article 314 of the Water Code. Under these conditions, the DGA can redistribute 
water and authorized additional ground and surface water withdrawals, without rights, in 
order to minimize the damage of the drought. Any rights-holder that is affected by the redis-
tribution is entitled to indemnification under Article 314. Resolution No. 674 replaced and 
modernized Resolution No. 39 (1984) by establishing new criteria for each Region in Chile, and 
explicitly referenced climate change and advances in science and technology as reasons for the 
new version.  
164. Three types of WUO are formally recognized in the Water Code, Canal Associa-
tions (Asociones de Canalistas), Supervisory Councils (Juntas de Vigilancia), and Water Com-
munities (Comunidades de Agua). Canal Associations (primarily irrigation) and Water Com-
munities (other uses) are formed by two or more users that share the same artificial water 
diversion system, whereas Supervisory Councils are made up the various users and user or-
ganizations within the same water basin. See Morán, supra note 145; See also Valdés-Pineda, 
supra note 13, at 2553. 
165. See Borzutzky & Madden, supra note 2, at 261. 
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management mechanisms.166 One traditional Spanish system that 
is implemented both at the canal and basin level is known as 
Turno, which proportionally reduces the amount of water for each 
rights holder by allocating water in shifts over a certain time pe-
riod.167 In addition, any water rights transactions that may take 
place within the same Canal Association or Water Community, 
whether temporary or permanent, can immediately be approved 
and implemented directly by the management of the Association 
or Community.168 Subsidized loans are also available for the im-
provement of existing infrastructure (e.g., lining canals to improve 
efficiency), as well as for the construction of new water infrastruc-
ture to be operated and maintained by the WUOs.169 Some WUOs 
have also retrofitted irrigation canals with small hydropower tur-
bines through private investment in order to increase revenues for 
improvement projects, such as those geared toward climate change 
adaptation.170 The primary difference with the Chilean approach 
is that there is very limited government oversight or control of 
these WUOs. In contrast with the Western United States, where 
cooperative organizations are authorized by law to work within a 
highly regulated system, the Chilean WUOs are a reaction to the 
lack of a regulatory or other (e.g., market-based) effective structure 
that could allocate resources in times of scarcity. 
On first glance, it might seem that it is Chilean law that is to 
blame for the conflicts between consumptive and non-consumptive 
uses, between irrigation and hydropower. At least as presently con-
figured and operating, the market-based approach has proven in-
capable of managing large-scale conflict, even if it has proven 
somewhat successful on smaller scales or in specific locations. In a 
prior appropriation system, like that used in Idaho, the question of 
whose rights must be satisfied first is relatively straight forward—
first in time, first in right. So arguably, if Chile would adopt a pri-
ority system more similar to that of western States, it might avoid 
this or similar problems in the future. Of course someone would 
lose, but the legal conflict would be straightforward. But it is not 
                                                          
166. See Hill, supra note 11, at 193. 
167. Id. 
168. See Lewin, supra note 146, at 9. 
169. Additional financing for adaptation is also available through the DGA as a result 
of drought declarations. See Hill, supra note 11, at 260261. 
170. See Bauer, supra note 12, at 642. 
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our law that makes the U.S. system work somewhat better in allo-
cating water between irrigators and hydroelectric facilities. Chile’s 
law would probably work well if Chile were like the western U.S. 
in other, non-legal ways. 
Despite recent international controversy about the Biobío, it 
remains a relatively undeveloped basin by U.S. standards. The 
main stem of the Biobío has only three major dams, the newest of 
which has been operating for just two years. While the total storage 
capacity of the system is apparently unknown, the two largest 
dams—Pangue and Ralco—can only capture about 5% of the Bi-
obío’s total runoff. In contrast, almost 100% of the annual runoff 
can be captured in the Sacramento River system. And in the Upper 
Snake River, the reservoirs capture over 80% of historical average 
flows. 
These higher storage capacities in the United States reflect 
systems designed for irrigation as much as hydropower, particu-
larly on the Snake River. The major dams on the Upper Snake were 
built by the Bureau of Reclamation, with the purpose of construct-
ing “irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development 
of waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands” in the 
western United States.171 But even with that primary focus, dams 
in the western United States incorporated hydropower from the 
very beginning as integral components of the overall water alloca-
tion system. Thus water managers could address potential con-
flicts from the very beginning, when the rights were first allocated. 
In Chile, in contrast, the dams are primarily (and exclusively 
in some cases) hydropower facilities. And those hydropower facili-
ties were all built relatively recently, after Chile’s agricultural 
economy had largely developed and water had been claimed for 
centuries. And these dams did not have the goal of promoting ag-
                                                          
171. 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1902) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 114-221 (2016)). The dams on 
the Upper Snake River are part of the Minidoka Project, first authorized in 1904 under au-
thority granted the Secretary of the Interior in the Newlands Act. Of the five original dams in 
the Minidoka Project, three were intended exclusively for irrigation purposes. The other two 
provided for both irrigation and power production. A history of the Minidoka Project is availa-
ble at the Bureau of Reclamation’s website: Minidoka Project, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Minidoka+Project (last visited March 3, 
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riculture in an arid environment. Finally, and critically, Chile’s hy-
dropower facilities are private, built with private funds for private 
purposes.172 
Thus as we compare the legal regimes in the Columbia River 
Basin and Chile, we should acknowledge that part of the reason we 
seem to avoid conflicts between irrigators and hydroelectric facili-
ties as severe as those in Chile is that we have already built a lot 
of dams, specifically for irrigation. Thus, we have already endured 
conflict and caused the ecological and cultural harms that Chile 
might still be able to—and might want to—avoid. As noted previ-
ously, the run-off storage capacity of the Upper Snake River infra-
structure is many times that of the Biobío, providing—at least from 
one perspective—“more” water to allocate among the competing us-
ers.173 The Columbia River Basin also benefitted from particular 
economic and settlement conditions that allowed for the irrigation 
and hydropower, such that most hydroelectric facilities in the 
American West have served those two purposes from the begin-
ning.174 It is not a fundamental component of our legal system that 
is better able to resolve conflict. It is, to some extent, something of 
a historical accident that our prior appropriation system works as 
well as it does. 
In fact, one of Idaho’s most significant historic conflicts be-
tween irrigators and a hydroelectric facility might best demon-
strate these points. In 1983, the Idaho Power Company sued 7,500 
upstream irrigators in a dispute over the water supply at its Swan 
Falls dam.175 The Swan Falls dam had water rights dating to 
1900,176 while a significant proportion of water rights in the Upper 
Snake River were associated with later Newlands Act and Carey 
                                                          
172. See Valdés-Pineda, supra note 13, at 2546. 
173. Stream flow data at Howell’s Ferry near Minidoka dates to April 1910. See USGS 
13081500 Snake R NR Minidoka ID (At Howell’s Ferry), U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://wa-
terdata.usgs.gov/nwis/inventory/?site_no=13081500 (last visited Sep. 14, 2016). 
174. DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
AMERICAN WEST 123 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
175. For a detailed discussion of the Swan Falls controversy, see Jeffrey C. Fereday & 
Michael C. Creamer, Swan Falls in 3-D: A New Look at the Historical, Legal and Practical 
Dimensions of Idaho’s Biggest Water Rights Controversy, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 573 (1992). 
176. Id. at 580. 
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Act projects.177 Thus, the lawsuit threatened to restrict irrigation 
on thousands of acres. 
While some of the conflict’s effects were significant,178 the 
Swan Falls Agreement ultimately allowed continued irrigation up-
stream of Swan Falls.179 But it was not some element inherent in 
our institutional regimes that provided a pathway to resolve the 
conflict. In fact, it was the strict application of the prior appropri-
ation doctrine that caused the conflict in the first place—Idaho wa-
ter law did not have a mechanism for adapting to changing climatic 
or water use regimes. Rather, it was the overall system’s physical 
flexibility, due both to its natural and constructed elements (in-
cluding sufficient available water at the time),180 as well as the po-
litical power of the irrigators, that created an agreement that con-
tinues working today—an agreement developed outside of the con-
fines of prior appropriation. That flexibility was provided in large 
part by the massive public investment in water infrastructure in 
upper parts of the river, rather than by the legal regime itself. But 
that flexibility, and even the political conditions benefitting irriga-
tors, might not exist to help resolve conflicts in the future. 
V. ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES AND CONNECTIONS TO THE 
NATURAL WORLD 
While the obvious geographical, historical, and legal differ-
ences are important, more subtle are some significant differences 
between Chile and the Columbia River Basin, particularly the ones 
that might have something more to teach us about how water re-
source regimes in the Columbia River Basin might be able to adapt 
in a changing climate. One of the differences between the Biobío 
and our rivers is that although the Biobío is the most biodiverse of 
                                                          
177. WORSTER, supra note 174, at 157–60. 
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Chilean rivers,181 it lacks the iconic native fishes found in western 
streams. Most of the native fish are small and largely unknown. 
The largest native fish is a homely species of catfish, reaching 
about eighteen inches in its largest examples. There are no native 
fishes valuable from either a commercial or cultural perspective. 
Although the native Pewenche182 people of the upper Biobío are 
considered a “sociedad ribereña” (a riverine society), they rely on 
the pine nuts of the native Pewen183 tree for both alimentary and 
spiritual sustenance. Their connection to rivers or fish is different 
from that of native peoples in the Pacific Northwest. 
Although some authors have pointed out that the salmon has 
not always been, nor is it necessarily even now, a cohesive cultural 
symbol, or “regional marker” for the Pacific Northwest region as a 
whole,184 salmon have played a pivotal role in the controversies 
over the region’s economy and development. This has included the 
legal implications of both an indigenous rights movement to re-
claim salmon as a first food and treaty right, and the listing of sev-
eral salmon species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The 
presence of salmon within the Columbia and Snake Rivers has pro-
foundly affected the management and regulation of water re-
sources.  
In the Columbia, salmon act as powerful agents, having far-
reaching effects on water management through Tribal treaty 
rights and the ESA. Tribes have lived and fished along the Colum-
bia and Snake Rivers since time immemorial, consuming up to 60% 
                                                          
181. While the Biobío is biodiverse by Chilean standards, it is much less biodiverse 
than the Columbia River Basin. The Columbia River Basin is home to thirty-one native fishes 
and twenty-six introduced fishes, many of which provide sport fishing opportunities. In con-
trast, the Biobío is home to seventeen native fishes and four introduced species. See Evelyn 
Habit et al., Response of the Fish Community to Human-Induced Changes in the Biobío River 
in Chile, 51 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 1 (2006). 
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183. Also called the Araucaria or monkey puzzle tree -- Araucaria araucana. 
184. John M. Findlay, A Fishy Proposition: Regional Identity in the Pacific Northwest, 
in DAVID M. WROBEL AND MICHAEL C. STEINER, MANY WESTS: PLACE, CULTURE, & REGIONAL 
IDENTITY 37 (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1997). 
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of their diet in calories from salmon.185 But beyond being a critical 
food source, salmon hold important spiritual and cultural signifi-
cance, providing connections between family members, intergener-
ational tradition, and a way of life that has nurtured both physical 
and mental health.186 Salmon numbers began to decline in the late 
1800s, with the introduction of industrial-scale fishing and can-
ning, the destruction of habitat, and a failed hatchery program.187 
Yet major dam development along the Columbia and Snake Rivers 
contributed to a loss of key fishing sites through inundation and 
blocked the migration of salmon runs, in many cases decimating 
runs to the point of extinction, especially in important, upriver 
fisheries. Despite these devastating losses, tribes in the Pacific 
Northwest are reasserting their treaty-given rights to fish at 
“usual and accustomed places.”188 These rights were fought for and 
won in several cases spanning the 1960s and ’70s, including: So-
happy v. Smith189 and United States v. Oregon190 in which the courts 
found that treaty rights to fish off-reservation were absolute, and 
United States v. Washington,191 in which Native American tribes 
were found to be entitled to up to 50% of harvestable fish. In the 
Biobío, the rights of indigenous peoples are only beginning to be 
realized, but with profound effects. 
The lack of an iconic, culturally-important, fish species might 
initially seem like a benefit to Chilean water managers, because it 
would seem to simplify integrated watershed management, rela-
tive to our experiences in the Columbia River Basin. But in many 
ways the opposite is true. If the ultimate goal is a river system that 
works for all of its inhabitants, providing cultural, ecological, hy-
dropower, flood control, and irrigation benefits, then salmon and 
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steelhead provide a useful focal point around which to engage in 
conversation and compromise. Salmon and steelhead have helped 
ensure continued political power and cultural relevance for native 
peoples. They provide reason for casual participants to care about 
river and ecosystem management. Salmon and steelhead compli-
cate management, to be sure, but also provide a reason for that 
management. While we might disagree about the best route to get 
there, we all care about the survival of anadromous fish popula-
tions. That focal point is missing in the Biobío. 
This is not to say that the absence of an iconic fish species, or 
some other environmental condensation point,192 prevents Chile-
ans from developing connections with the natural world and thus 
seeking to protect or effectively manage it. Although the develop-
ment of legal regimes in Chile to protect the natural environment 
occurred relatively recently, the country has made significant pro-
gress.193 Environmental protection was formally connected to water 
resources in Chile in the early 1990’s with the passing of the Envi-
ronmental Law and the System of Environmental Impact Assess-
ment (SEIA).194 Chile’s first environmental agency (CONAMA), 
now the Ministry of Environment (MMA), was also created to man-
age EIAs for projects such as mines and dams.195 The Law estab-
lished the “right to a clean environment and protection of the en-
vironment,” as well as the right to environmental information held 
                                                          
192. In this context, a “condensation point” is a particular resource conflict, or other 
moment in time, that causes all of the various constituencies to focus on a particular issue. 
See, e.g., Peter B. Nelson, Rural Restructuring in the American West: Land Use, Family and 
Class Discourses, 17 J. Rural Stud. 395, 400 (2001). 
193. See, for example, Chile’s recent decision to reject the large HidroAysén hydroe-
lectric project in Southern Patagonia. Brian Clark Howard, Chile Scraps Huge Patagonia Dam 
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194. See Morán, supra note 145, at 2. 
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by authorities, and required that public participation and environ-
mental education campaigns be facilitated by the State.196 Further-
more, the SEIA established the primary mechanism for direct pub-
lic participation in project development.197 
In addition, amendments to the Water Code in 2005 estab-
lished a minimum ecological flow requirement for new water rights 
allocations,198 although the minimum flow requirement does not 
apply to rights established prior to 2005. The 2005 amendments 
also grant the President the ability to establish ecological flows (to 
a limited amount) and reserve flows in any basin, as long as they 
do not affect third party rights.199 The President also has the dis-
cretionary power under the legislation to remove water rights from 
the market to protect public interest.200 The 2005 amendments also 
require the DGA to develop quality standards for both surface and 
groundwater.201 
In addition to these steps forward, Chile has recently enacted 
a new law for public participation that goes beyond the framework 
in the EIA in requiring each agency to formalize a specific method 
for people and organizations “to participate in policies, plans, pro-
grammes [sic] and actions.”202 Chile has also actively adopted in-
ternational environmental conventions, “such as the United Na-
tions Convention on Climate Change; the United Nations Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification; the Convention on Conservation of 
Biodiversity, the Ramsar Convention to protect wetlands; [and] the 
Washington Convention to protect National Parks and Scenic Val-
ues.”203 With these new rules in place, the DGA now has broader 
authority to block or stall undesirable projects with environmental 
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concerns by denying new rights for such projects based on environ-
mental preservation, auctioning rights among parties in conflict, 
or continuously requesting additional impact studies.204 
The Biobío provides an excellent example of the effect of 
Chile’s changing attitude toward the natural environment, but in 
a situation that might have appeared initially to have been a fail-
ure. The Ralco Hydroelectric Plant was first proposed for an area 
high in the Andes region on the Biobío in 1994.205 It was ultimately 
completed in 2003 amid heavy national and international criti-
cism.206 Ralco was designed as a 578 MW reservoir-type dam up-
stream of Pangue, with 1,174 million cubic meters of water stor-
age—at least ten times larger than any other artificial reservoir in 
the Region.207 However, unlike the Pangue project, downstream ir-
rigators were not part of the conflict, likely due to the fact that the 
Ralco project was specifically designed to provide summertime flow 
in order to keep Pangue operable during the dry season, which ben-
efitted agriculture.208 However, the project required the flooding 
and destruction of 3,500 hectares of traditional territories and na-
tive forests of the indigenous Pewenche Peoples, named for the na-
tive Pewen (pine nut) tree that represents their fundamental First 
Food, similar to the role of salmon in the Northwest United 
States.209 The project also required the relocation of 675 people, 
most of whom were Pewenche.210 
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Despite initial approval of Ralco’s EIA in 1997, the residents 
appealed under the 1994 Environmental Law and the 1993 Indig-
enous Peoples’ Law, which resulted in the overturning of the EIA 
in 2003 after the project had reached eighty percent completion.211 
Although the Chilean government continued to support the project, 
international pressure and the involvement of the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission ultimately convinced the Chilean gov-
ernment to agree to a program of sizeable payments to Pewenche 
families.212 In addition, the government also agreed to ratify ILO 
169, strengthen indigenous rights laws (including constitutional 
recognition), improve and strengthen processes for indigenous ter-
ritory recognition and participation in development, and create 
measures for environmental protection in the Andes region of the 
Biobío Basin (including no additional dam projects in the area).213 
But a more recent Chilean controversy demonstrates the value 
of salmon and steelhead as a focal point for conflict resolution in 
the Columbia River Basin. Chile’s largest river (by volume) is the 
Rio Baker, in the southern reaches of Patagonia.214 The Baker flows 
out of Lago General Carrera and passes to the east of the Northern 
Patagonia Ice Field before emptying into the Pacific Ocean.215 It is 
one of the last free flowing rivers in the world of its size, and is an 
attractive location for hydroelectric development.216 In 2011, the 
Chilean government approved a massive multi-dam project on the 
Baker and the nearby Rio Pascua known as HidroAysén.217 Hidro-
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Aysén would be the country’s largest ever energy project, consist-
ing of five total dams and capable of providing one-fifth of Chile’s 
total electricity supply.218 
Despite that initial approval, HidroAysén remained extremely 
controversial. Even with the significant political influence of the 
companies involved, and the work of eight different Chilean uni-
versities that collaborated on the effort,219 Chilean government 
agencies were harshly critical of the project’s environmental anal-
ysis.220 Initially submitted in August of 2008, criticism by both gov-
ernment agencies and citizen groups concerned with impacts to the 
delicate and undeveloped Patagonian ecosystem caused the pro-
posal to be withdrawn and resubmitted nine months later.221 The 
DGA also denied new water rights that were pending for the pro-
ject as a result of the project review.222 When the EIA was finally 
approved three years later, it included a number of conditions, in-
cluding a full audit of the entire EIA.223 Notwithstanding the initial 
approval, the project was ultimately rejected in 2014 by the Chil-
ean Committee of Ministers under the advisement of the Minister 
of Environment.224 
HidroAysén suggests two interesting things about Chile’s cur-
rent environmental context. On the one hand, that the government 
would reject a previously-approved project with such significant 
political and economic support demonstrates that both the govern-
ment itself and the environmental community have made signifi-
cant strides since the controversies on the Biobío in the previous 
two decades. Those strides are significant and should be cele-
brated. However, the Rio Baker is extremely far removed from the 
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daily lives of most Chileans, and most Chileans are unlikely to be 
able to visit the area, given the high costs of travel to Patagonia. 
And while the opposition to HidroAysén contained a significant 
homegrown Chilean element, and was of some importance 
throughout the country, much of the opposition also came from out-
side Chile. The “Consejo de Defensa de la Patagonia Chilena,” or 
Patagonia Defense Council, for example consists of dozens of dif-
ferent entities, many of which are not from Chile.225 
If this is true, if a large number of Chileans lack a significant 
personal connection to Patagonia and the phenomenal ecosystems 
and landscapes that are found there, what is the future of environ-
mental protection in that region? In the Columbia River Basin, the 
salmon provide a focal point around which many conservation con-
versations can focus. And perhaps more important, the rivers and 
landscapes are readily accessible to millions of Americans, both 
from the region and elsewhere. In Chile, there are no iconic fish 
species, and many Chileans lack the economic capacity to visit 
Chile’s iconic landscapes. And one significant component of Pata-
gonian tourism—fly fishing—is very expensive, not particularly 
important culturally, and, perhaps ironically, relies on non-native 
fish species introduced from North America and Europe. 
In a climate-altered future, in which demand for low-carbon 
energy sources will only increase, pressure will continue to mount 
to approve new hydroelectric projects like HidroAysén or the pro-
posals on the Biobío. As the American experience demonstrates—
where environmental laws that once passed with near unanimous 
votes in Congress now struggle to find support226—environmental 
victories are always only temporary. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This article’s purpose is to consider what Chile’s water re-
sources experience might have to teach the Columbia River Basin 
about how climate change might alter its future. Although it does 
not provide solutions to the serious legal and environmental rami-
fications for anadromous fish, the “Organic Machine” of the Colum-
bia River Basin serves its two original masters relatively well, 
providing substantial storage for late summer irrigation while sim-
ultaneously providing the nation’s cheapest supply of electricity.227 
Chile faces an ongoing battle between those same interests, with a 
water infrastructure that presently seems incapable of balancing 
competing needs. But this is not because of any inherent advantage 
of American institutional regimes. 
There are three reasons, at least, that might explain why there 
is less conflict between irrigators and hydroelectric facilities in the 
western United States than in Chile: First, we have built far more 
dams, have much greater storage capacity, and capture far more of 
the annual runoff than can water managers in the Biobío Basin, or 
anywhere else in Chile. While this does not avoid all water use con-
flicts, it does provide “more” water to work with, but at significant 
costs to riparian ecosystems, migratory fish species, and native cul-
tures that Chileans are only beginning to experience. Perhaps 
more significant, most dams in the Columbia River Basin are man-
aged by government agencies accountable to a wide variety of dif-
ferent interests and values, in addition to power production. Chile’s 
private dams do not have the same obligations. 
Second, the water infrastructure in the Columbia River Basin 
emerged as the region was undergoing significant growth in both 
irrigation and electricity demand.228 Consequently, with limited ex-
ceptions (and those mostly due to geography), dams in the Colum-
bia River Basin were designed to serve both irrigation and hydro-
power needs, and are managed with both purposes in mind. Fortu-
itously, irrigators also demand their water at a time of year when 
electricity use is high (due to increased use of air conditioning and 
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irrigation pumps); thus, water can be passed through dams to 
serve downstream irrigators and produce power. In Chile, where 
electricity demand is much higher in winter than summer, irriga-
tors and power producers do not share the same beneficially coin-
cident timing of their uses. Unlike Chile, therefore, hydroelectric 
facilities in the western U.S. can fill their reservoirs when the wa-
ter is not needed by irrigators, and pass water when it is. 
Further, the Biobío Basin currently provides 19% of the elec-
tricity for Chile’s entire Sistema Interconectado Central.229 In the 
U.S., all hydropower from all river systems only accounts for 7% of 
our total power supply.230 Consequently, the importance of hydro-
power in the Biobío is much greater, relative to irrigation. It is also 
important in a national, rather than a regional, sense. Chilean ir-
rigators do not have the same political power,231 compared to pri-
vate hydroelectric companies,232 as do U.S. irrigators. 
Finally, as we begin to consider the adaptations that climate 
change might require, the people of the Columbia River Basin are 
situated in a different cultural and environmental context than 
contemporary Chileans. Whether it is, in fact, a culturally-unifying 
symbol or not, salmon provide a space for all interests to come to-
gether to consider the effects of dams on natural river systems. 
Salmon have also served to empower native peoples who might oth-
erwise be excluded from river management decisions. Although 
Patagonia, as a region and source of national pride might ulti-
mately serve this purpose, Chile appears to lack a similar unifying 
focal point. 
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All of these reasons are, in part, simply accidents of history, 
geography, and ecology. Of course, choices to enact the New Deal, 
or to protect declining fish species, were not accidents. Those were 
conscious efforts to improve our world, both initially when we built 
the dams, and later when we recognized the consequences of those 
earlier actions. But the fact that the salmon exist for us to care 
about, protect, and to unify us as we consider our future, is an ac-
cident, as are the coincident demands for electricity and irrigation, 
the Depression that led to the New Deal, and the ensuing patriotic 
fervor, that motivated and justified our large dam projects. 
As climate change alters hydrological and socioecological sys-
tems, these same fortuitous aspects of our overall water regime 
may no longer exist. Just as climate and cultural change might al-
ter Chile’s power demands and the balance of its hydropower pro-
duction and irrigation needs, similar changes might unbalance our 
own currently precariously balanced hydropower and irrigation 
needs. Further, while we presently rely on public management of 
an enormous public infrastructure, the neoliberal policies of con-
temporary American governance are moving away from public 
ownership and management, which might lead to a future in which 
our water infrastructure need not consider our complex tapestry of 
cultural values and expectations. Similarly troubling, climate 
change might also further threaten salmon and steelhead popula-
tions. In the Pacific Northwest, these fish provide a continuing cul-
tural connection to our rivers. As those fish are threatened, so too 
is our connection with and concern for natural rivers. 
Ultimately, Chile’s lesson for the western United States is per-
haps both simple and obvious, but crucial nonetheless: our water 
resource institutions must take into account the changing cultural, 
hydrological, ecological, and climatic context of our region. In the 
past, we have avoided or successfully managed conflict between ir-
rigators and hydropower, in part, because the specific conditions 
that existed at that particular time, potentially independent of the 
actual legal structures governing those conditions. The Chilean ex-
perience suggests that a different social, cultural, geographic, or 
climatic context might lead to conflicts our existing institutions are 
unable to address. And our changing climate suggests that we are 
likely to face different social, cultural, geographic, and climatic 
contexts in the near future. If avoiding conflict was due to a histor-
ical accident as much as our intentional actions, we must be aware 
that those same accidents might not happen again in the future. 
The Columbia River Basin will be a different place—culturally, 
ecologically, hydrologically, and climatically—and our water re-
source institutions must prepare for that. 
